Individual Application

The Facts

The applicant, entitled to become a labour inspector at the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (the administration), applied to the administration on 1 November 2017 as his appointment process had not been completed for so long. In its reply dated 15 November 2017, the administration informed the applicant that the relevant process was still pending and that he would be notified of the completion of the process. Not considering the administration’s reply as final pursuant to Article 10 of Law no. 2577, the applicant awaited the final reply for a period of six months starting on the date of his application with the administration. Upon the administration’s failure to send a new reply within the six-month time-limit, the applicant brought an administrative action on 13 June 2018, seeking the revocation of the administration’s act of 15 November 2017. The incumbent administrative court dismissed the applicant’s case as time-barred, stating that he should have brought an action within six months from his application to the administration, which was until 1 May 2018. The applicant's appeal request was also rejected, and the administrative court’s decision was ultimately upheld. After filing the individual application, the applicant applied to the administration again, this time seeking the redress of his personal and financial rights he had been deprived of. Upon dismissal of his request, the applicant brought an action before the Council of State. Revoking the impugned act of the administration on 14 January 2020, the Council of State ultimately ordered the payment of the relevant amounts the applicant had been deprived of, plus the legal interest incurred.

The Applicant’s Allegations

The applicant claimed that his right of access to a court had been violated due to rejection, as time-barred, of the action brought by him, challenging the dismissal of his request for appointment.

The Court’s Assessment

It is at the discretion of inferior courts to interpret the statutory provisions underlying the interference in a dispute. It is not for the Court to review whether the inferior courts’ interpretations are expedient. However, in cases where it is concluded that the said interpretations contradict the wording of the law or where it is unforeseeable for individuals, the impugned interference with the right of access to a court may considered as lacking a legal basis.

It is laid down in Article 10 of Law no. 2577 that the persons concerned may request the administrative authorities to implement an act or take an action that may be the subject of an administrative case. It is also specified therein that if the reply received from the administration is not final, the relevant persons can bring an action, considering the said reply as a rejection of their request, or they can await the final decision of the administration. If the final reply is awaited, the period prescribed for bringing an action shall not run; however, the waiting period cannot exceed six months from the date of application. It is explicitly specified in the relevant law that the time-limit for bringing an action shall start running upon the expiry of six months during which a final reply is awaited. In fact, this rule has also been stressed in the relevant case-law of the Council of State.

In the present case, the applicant did not consider the reply he had received from the administration as final, and upon receiving no other reply within the six-month waiting period, he brought an administrative action within the remaining time. Accordingly, given the wording of the said provision as well as the pertinent case-law, the manner in which the inferior courts interpreted the provision in the present case was unforeseeable.

Hence, since the applicable statutory provision was interpreted in an unforeseeable manner, it led to the dismissal, as time-barred, of the applicant’s action whereby he challenged the dismissal of his request for being appointed as a labour inspector. Thus, the impugned interference did not satisfy the lawfulness requirement.

Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court.