Individual Application

The Facts

The applicant notified the relevant Governor’s Office of his intention to organise an event at Kadıköy Pier Square. The Governor’s Office denied the request on the grounds that the mentioned venue was not indicated as one of the designated assembly venues as per Article 6 of Law no. 2911 on Meetings and Demonstrations, and that organising an event outside the previously designated venues would be deemed illegal solely on this basis, in accordance with Article 23 of the same Law. The applicant’s action for the annulment of the administrative act was dismissed. Subsequently, the applicant filed an appeal; however, the Council of State upheld the decision on the grounds that it was in accordance with procedure and law, thereby dismissing the applicant’s request with final effect.

The Applicant’s Allegations

The applicant maintained that his right to hold meetings and demonstration marches had been violated due to the denial of permission for his preferred venue on the grounds that it was not among the assembly and march routes designated by the local authorities.

The Court’s Assessment

Considering the significance of organising meetings and demonstrations to achieve their intended purposes, the Court has found that an abstract and categorical restriction on the choice of venue is unacceptable under the Constitution. It has acknowledged that certain venues might need to be chosen to hold meetings to attract the attention of the target audience. Therefore, the freedom to select the most appropriate venue for a meeting should be granted to the organisers. Consequently, any restrictions imposed by public authorities in this context must comply with the requirements of a democratic society, under the particular circumstances of the case.

Furthermore, the Court has noted that Article 6 § 1 of Law no. 2911 explicitly states that meetings and demonstrations can be conducted anywhere, thus the venue for meetings and demonstrations is designated as any place. Therefore, all public spaces must be open and available for organising meetings. The pre-designation of venues for meetings and demonstrations by the administration does not preclude the possibility of organising them in other locations.

In the present case, the Governor’s Office failed to make an assessment based on the nature, form, purpose, duration, number of participants, security risk of the impugned meeting, as well as whether it would excessively and unbearably complicate daily life, and whether an alternative venue outside the specified location would render the right to assembly ineffective. Instead, the decision was solely based on the fact that the meeting venue was not one of the locations previously designated by the administration and did not attempt to strike a fair balance between competing interests. Hence, it has been assessed that the Governor’s Office, by broadly interpreting the restriction clause without considering that the primary purpose of the relevant legal regulation is to facilitate the effective exercise of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches, proceeded with the administrative act.

Therefore, public authorities, alongside other measures aimed at protecting the right to peaceful assembly, should also avoid practices that would lead to unreasonable restrictions and create implicit barriers to the right. Notably, it is incumbent upon the Governor’s Office, which interfered with the freedom to choose a venue, and the administrative judiciary, which reviewed such interference, to demonstrate and substantiate that the interference stemmed from an essential social need. To avoid arbitrariness in the interference with the right and to justify the interference, these authorities should, instead of imposing a categorical restriction based merely on whether the meeting venue is not among the pre-designated assembly and demonstration locations, make assessments on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific circumstances. As in the present case, applying a literal interpretation of the provisions in Law no. 2911, without considering the necessity of the interference from the perspective of the requirements of a democratic society, thereby excluding the possibility of organising meetings and demonstrations outside the venues determined by the Governor’s Office, constitutes an implicit restriction on the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches.

Moreover, the administrative court found the administrative act lawful but did not engage in any effort to justify how it reached this conclusion, thus confining this review to the assessment of the lawfulness of the impugned administrative act.

Furthermore, the applicant, who claimed that the purpose of the meeting was to highlight environmental damages, argued that the assembly venues mandated by the administration were in violation of environmental and urban planning principles, thereby not serving the purposes of the assembly. Nevertheless, the administrative judiciary did not undertake any investigation or assessment on this issue either.

As a result, it has been determined that the interference with the applicant’s right to hold meetings and demonstration marches did not conform to the requirements of a democratic society.

Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches.