Individual Application

The Facts

The applicant, a member of a union operating in the mining and quarrying sector, worked as an accounting supervisor at the defendant workplace between 8 February 2000 and 22 October 2014. During this period, collective labour agreements (CLAs) covering every two or three years were concluded between the employer and the authorised union at the relevant workplace.

The applicant maintained that a large group of white-collar employees, including herself, had been excluded from the scope of the CLAs and therefore could not benefit from the provisions thereof. In this regard, she unsuccessfully brought an action before the incumbent civil court –acting as a labour court– claiming the entitlements and other labour rights arising from the CLAs. Upon appeal, the regional court of appeal quashed the first-instance decision. Following a retrial, the civil court once again dismissed the case. The applicant’s subsequent appeal was rejected on the merits by the regional court of appeal, with no right of further appeal.

The Applicant’s Allegations

The applicant claimed that she had been excluded from the scope of CLAs, which was in breach of her right to trade union freedom.

The Court’s Assessment

Pursuant to Article 53 of the Constitution, workers and employers have the right to conclude collective labour agreements in order to regulate reciprocally their economic and social situations, as well as their working conditions. By its very nature, this right can be exercised collectively, and is therefore exercised by workers through trade unions. Thus, according to Article 53 § 1, all workers have the right to conclude CLAs for the purpose of regulating their economic and social situations, as well as their working conditions. The right to conclude CLAs necessarily encompasses not only the formal act of concluding such an agreement but also the right to benefit from it. Accordingly, any practice or interpretation that prevents workers from concluding CLAs, either partially or completely, would constitute a violation of the aforementioned provision of the Constitution.

As a matter of fact, it is explicitly set forth in the Law no. 6356 on Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements that, with the exception of employer representatives and those participating in CLA negotiations on behalf of the employer, all workers have the right to benefit from CLAs.

In the present case, it has been observed that the applicant, a white-collar employee, had been excluded from the scope of CLAs. Nevertheless, the incumbent courts failed to clarify how the applicant’s deprivation of such a constitutional right had been substantiated in light of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. Therefore, a restrictive legal interpretation resulting in such a serious consequence as the deprivation of a constitutional right must, in the particular circumstances of the case, be based on findings demonstrating that either the applicant acted as her employer’s representative or participated in CLA negotiations on behalf of the employer.

The first-instance court, guided by the regional court of appeal, confined itself to specifying that there was no inequality among the out-of-scope employee, as none of them benefited from the provisions of CLAs. This decision was subsequently upheld by the regional court of appeal with final effect. Although, it was indicated in the case file that the applicant worked as an accounting supervisor, it contained no details regarding her duties and responsibilities, salary, or whether she acted in the capacity of employer within the organisational structure. Thus, given that the incumbent courts failed to make an assessment on these aspects but concluded that the applicant could not claim entitlements arising from CLAs solely because she was classified as a white-collar employee and was treated the same as other white-collar employees, it has been found out that the reasoning relied on by the courts was not relevant.

As a result, the applicant was excluded from the scope of CLAs on the ground that she was an out-of-scope employee. However, the lack of relevant and sufficient reasoning by the courts did not comply with the State’s positive obligations to ensure an effective judicial review within the meaning of the right to trade union freedom.

Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to trade union freedom.