Individual Application

The Facts

The applicants, who are public officials, were given a warning/reprimand as disciplinary penalties for having attended certain meetings and demonstration marches of an unlawful nature. The actions brought by the applicants for the annulment of the imposed disciplinary penalties were dismissed.  

The Applicants’ Allegations

The applicants maintained that the imposition of a disciplinary penalty for their attendance at certain meetings and demonstration marches was in breach of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches.

The Court’s Assessment

1. As regards the Application no. 2017/32534

A disciplinary penalty was imposed on the applicants, who are teachers, for having attended a protest under the name of “March for Respect for Secular Education and Labour”. The demonstration organised by the Union of which the applicants were members was banned by the Governor’s Office, and the police intervened in the march attended by the applicants.

The applicants were given a disciplinary penalty for having participated in a demonstration march banned by the Governor’s Office and considered to become unlawful for blocking traffic, which amounted to performing an act during out-of-work hours that would hamper the reputation of, and trust in, public officials.

As acknowledged by the Court, the public officials may be imposed a disciplinary sanction proportionate to the severity of the activities or conducts in their private life in so far as such activities or conducts have a bearing on their public office. However, it must be demonstrated by administrative and judicial authorities with relevant and sufficient grounds that the impugned activity or conduct of a given public official has had a bearing on his public office.

In the present case, the meeting had been banned by the Governor’s Office pursuant to Article 11 (c) of the Law on Provincial Administration. However, there was no concrete and reasonable explanations by the administrative organs and judicial authorities as to the reasons why the said meeting had been considered to fall into the scope of this provision and why it was the single solution to ban the meeting.

In addition, the incumbent court, dealing with the criminal case brought against the applicants for having refused to disperse despite the warnings and ultimately acquitting them, noted that the demonstration march where the applicants attended had not obstructed the traffic flow to an extent which would cause an extraordinary situation. As also stated by the court, it could not be definitely established that the applicants had committed the imputed offence. 

In the light of the abovementioned findings, the Court has considered that neither the administrative court nor the inferior court handling the case concerning the disciplinary penalty could provide relevant and sufficient grounds so as to explain in which manner the applicants had acted in defiance of their status as a public official. Accordingly, in the present case, the inferior courts failed to establish, through a concrete assessment, any unfavourable effect of the applicants’ impugned conduct on the public service or whether their conduct had caused damage to the reputation of, and trust in, public officials.  

Therefore, the Court has concluded that it could not be sufficiently demonstrated that the disciplinary penalties imposed on the applicants met a pressing social need and were necessary in a democratic society; and that the impugned disciplinary sanctions were therefore unjust.

Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches.

2. As regards the Application no. 2017/15845

The applicants, who are public officials, attended certain meetings in Adana so as to protest the incidents taking place during the Gezi Park events. They were therefore given warning since they had displayed behaviours and conducts that were not in keeping with the dignity of a state official. The actions brought by the applicants for the annulment of the disciplinary penalties imposed on them were dismissed due to the unlawful nature of the impugned meetings. Both the administrative court and the inferior court acknowledged that these meetings where the Gezi Park events had been protested were unlawful as being held without a prior notice and becoming devoid of peaceful nature.

It appears that the applicants did not challenge the acknowledgment that the meetings they had attended became devoid of peaceful nature. They merely stated that they had not involved in any violent act.

According to the Court, the State expects its officials to instil trust and confidence in the individuals for the proper conduct of public services. In this sense, the public officials are charged and held liable, by the State, to abstain from performing acts or actions which would undermine the public confidence and trust in them or damage the reliability or prestige of the public institutions where they hold office.

In the present case, the Court has observed that although it was explicitly foreseeable -in an extraordinary way- that the violent acts within the scope of the Gezi Park events were still ongoing given both the meetings held in Adana where the applicants had attended as well as the country-wide protests held for the same purpose, the applicants did not argue that they had left the impugned meetings or acted in any other possible way in order to refrain from breaching the obligations originating from their status as a public official. In this sense, it appears that the applicants did not provide any information which would require the Court to depart from the acknowledgement that within the scope of the disciplinary law, the applicants had acted in breach of the obligations incumbent on them as a public official. Regard being had to all these considerations, it has been concluded that the disciplinary penalties imposed on the applicants had met a pressing social need.    

On the other hand, the imposition of a warning, the most lenient disciplinary sanction prescribed in the relevant legislation, did not place an unfair burden on the applicants’ right to assembly vis-à-vis the legitimate aim of maintaining public order. It has been observed that the competent authorities could strike a fair balance between the applicants’ right to hold meetings and demonstration marches and the requirements emanating from the public officials’ duty of loyalty to the State. Accordingly, it has been considered that the impugned disciplinary penalties were compatible with the requirements of a democratic society. 

Consequently, the Court has found no violation of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches.