Foundations of the Idea of Human Rights^*

Zühtü Arslan ^**

Honourable Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Kazakhstan,

Distinguished Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Rector, Vice Rector of Khoja Akhmed Yassawi University,

Distinguished Academics and Dear Students,

I would like to extend you all my most sincere and respectful greetings.

I wish a successful and productive academic year for Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University. I congratulate the administrators of the University for declaring the academic year we are inaugurating as the "Year of Human Rights".

Today's inaugural lecture may also be considered as the first of the "Year of Human Rights" activities. In this context, let me touch upon some aspects of human rights idea and practice.

Dear Youth,
Distinguished Guests,

It should be primarily noted that human rights are not an idea with which we are unfamiliar, which is externally imposed or which we inherit from others. Of course, concepts and institutions take on different forms through the history and in different geographies. In this sense, the current formulation and protection system of human rights emerged and developed as a response to the massacres, genocides and massive violations of rights taking place in the West, especially between and during the two world wars.

Besides, human rights are a common heritage of the East and the West, as are tolerance, equality, justice and the rule of law. The roots of this idea may be found in different civilisations and cultures. In this context, we may easily come across in our spiritual roots the origins of universal views on human beings as the subject of human rights, as well as on the social/political formations that human beings constitute.

Today, the greatest challenge in the theory and practice of human rights is the protection of the rights of “the other”. In other words, the subject of human rights should, by definition, cover “every human being”, regardless of religion, language, race or belief. We, however, see in many cases that the scope of the subject has been narrowed. We are witnessing that an understanding inspired by George Orwell, according to which some are more equal, is prevailing, and moreover, in many places, the "other" is treated as "garbage" that does not even deserve to live, let alone be equal, but rather should be destroyed.

In particular, xenophobic, racist and Islamophobic attitudes towards refugees encroach the fundamental rights and freedoms of those who are excluded from society and stigmatised as “the other”. This rapidly spreading virus is also poisoning day by day the climate necessary for the coexistence of differences.

The antidote to this poison is the human-oriented approach which was planted in these lands hundreds of years ago by Pir-î Turkistan Khoja Akhmed Yassawi and which later flourished in Anatolia and the Balkans. This approach aims for, at the individual level, a perfect (mature) human being (insan-ı kâmil)- who acts morally as well as for, at the social/political level, a pluralistic and fair administration.

Contemporary civilisation cannot be said to have done well in ensuring the realisation of these two goals. The deep crisis of this era largely results from the failure to establish a sound relationship with those regarded as “the other”. In a world where we consider that it is merely us who deserve anything good, while depriving others of all rights, including the right to life, conflict and crisis are inevitable. Recognising the right of “the other" to exist only on the condition that they become someone else, or more precisely, that they resemble us, inevitably gives rise to a conflict.

We must put into practice the values of morality and justice so as to overcome this crisis and to be able to build a habitable world. It is a requisite of moral action to consider those who are not like us to be on the common ground of “human being”, and for the very reason, to accept that “the others” also possess the rights we already enjoy.

In his Hikmets (mysteries), Khoja Akhmet Yassawi cites a moral action that embraces the one who is different. Yassawî says in the very first Hikmet: “It is the Sunnah not to harm even the infidels / God abhors the cold-hearted and unkind”.¹ He also adds “Wherever you see a broken-hearted person, be a remedy and relief for him / If such an aggrieved person is stranded on his way, be his companion.”²

The very essence of Yassawi’s idea is the concern for transforming human into a perfect (mature) being, in compliance with his creation. The Hikmets describe the requirements of being a perfect human. Accordingly, such human is the one who abstains from vices such as pride, arrogance and cruelty and gains virtues such as humility, altruism and justice. Akhmet Yassawî says that he abstains from selfish and hard-hearted people.³ In short, the human addressed by the Hikmets "respects rights and law, as well as human rights and [has] honest earnings.”⁴

This understanding that recognises the ontological existence and rights of “the other" is a prerequisite for a sound social coexistence. Undoubtedly, it is not easy for people with different beliefs, thoughts or lifestyles to embrace each other. In consideration of the historical experience, such expectation is not realistic either. However, it is possible and necessary for people to tolerate each other's existence and respect their differences.

This undoubtedly entails the existence of a political order in pursuance of a pluralist social life and justice. In fact, justice is the foundation of all virtues and the greatest virtue of all virtues. In the absence of justice, there is no way to live together and get organised in the form of state. 

In one of his Hikmets, Khoja Akhmet Yassawi points to injustice as the underlying reason of any kind of unrest and evil:

“Today’s people have no generosity,
Sultans and viziers have no justice,
The dervishes' prayers have no acceptance,
All kinds of trouble rained down on the people, friends!”⁵

Then, what is justice that is so vital for our social and political life? The best response to this question is given by Mevlânâ Celâleddin-i Rûmî, one of the wise men of Anatolia, who followed Khoja Akhmet Yassawi.

Mevlânâ defines justice by making a comparison with its opposite, oppression. According to Mevlânâ, justice is putting everything in its proper place, while oppression is putting something in a place where it is not supposed to be. Therefore, watering tree is justice whereas watering thorn bushes amounts to oppression.⁶

In this sense, justice is to give due to what one deserves and to ensure the exercise of a right by its holder. Oppression is, in the most general sense, the infringement of a right. Justice is a matter of action, as is the morality. Justice may be secured, at all levels, through just acts and actions. The result of these actions and the impression they leave on those who act are opposite. In Mevlânâ's words, justice results in peace of mind, while oppression brings along guilty conscience.⁷

Dear Friends,
Distinguished Participants,

Indubitably, the conceptual existence of morality and justice does not suffice. These two concepts must guide our behaviours and conducts, that is to say, acts and actions must be performed in a moral and just action. Only in this case can we have the opportunity to maintain our lives as equal and free individuals endowed with fundamental rights and freedoms in a pluralist society affording protection to human being and all his inherent values.

The materialisation of values of morality and justice requires a well-functioning legal order built on solid foundations. That is because, wrongs, injustices and unfairness that arise between people may be eliminated and prevented only in a just legal order.

One of those who emphasised this fact is one of the greatest thinkers and poets of Kazakhstan, Ibrahim (Abai) Qunanbaiūly. About 150 years ago, in his poem "Studying in a boarding school", Abai addressed the youth like you, referring them to the law:

 “There is law against wrongdoing;
In such a case, you may apply to the court.
As the wrongdoer is not the governor,
He will inevitably submit to justice.”⁸

The sayings of Khoja Akhmet Yassawi, Mevlânâ and Abai all point to the same truth: the need to control power, confine it within moral limits and combine it with justice. To that end, the law and the courts that will implement the former are needed.

In this context, the main task of all courts, especially constitutional courts, is to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms that individuals inherently possess by preventing possible injustices by sultans, viziers and governors.

The duly protection of human rights depends on the understanding of the wisdom inherent therein. It should be stressed once again that being human is sufficient to possess and exercise human rights. The subject of these rights is “human”, regardless of colour, race, language, religion, faith and opinions…

In this sense, the subject of human rights is at the same time “the other”. As expressed by Lyotard, one of the pioneers of postmodernism, every human being “carries within him the figure of the other”. So indeed, each of us is “the other” in the eyes of someone else. We are others for the other. For this very reason, human rights are at the same time “the other’s rights”.⁹

The judiciary, especially the constitutional judiciary, has an important role to play in the protection of human rights, as the rights that we and the other have. In fact, the raison d'être of constitutional courts is to safeguard the rights and freedoms deriving from human dignity.

To that end, the Turkish Constitutional Court has been exerting efforts to carry out its duty to protect human rights in the best and most effective manner. The rights-based approach adopted by the Constitutional Court in the protection of fundamental rights is not an embodiment of an externally imposed concept, but a reflection of the human-oriented understanding rooted in the teachings of scholars such as Khoja Akhmed Yassawi, Mevlânâ, Hadji Bektash Veli and Yunus Emre.

Dear Youth,

For the effective protection of human rights, it is necessary to struggle "hostility towards the other" at all levels and in all forms. The most effective way of this struggle is to implement an inclusive and pluralist understanding based on moral and just action, which does not marginalize people, in our own lands.

We already have the necessary intellectual heritage for this. All that is needed is to put them into practice, ensuring them to go beyond a mere discourse.

With these feelings and considerations, I wish Khoja Akhmed Yassawi University an auspicious 2023-24 academic year. I congratulate all the administrators, the esteemed academics and students who strive for the success of this centre of knowledge and wisdom.

I commemorate Khoja Akhmed Yassawi, the spiritual architect of these lands and Anatolia, with mercy and gratitude. I would like to end my speech with a wish inspired by him: May your every wish be granted, may your heart be filled with the joy of wisdom and love.

I would like to once again extend you all my sincere regards as well as my best wishes for health and prosperity.

^* Inaugural lecture delivered on the occasion of the Opening Ceremony of the Academic Year 2023-2024 of Khoja Akhmed Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University, Turkestan, 4 September 2023.

^** President of the Constitutional Court of Türkiye.

¹ Khoja Akhmet Yassawi, Dîvân-ı Hikmet, 12^th Edition, Prep. by H. Bice, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2023), Hikmet 1, p.5.

² Dîvân-ı Hikmet, Hikmet 1, p.3.

³ Dîvân-ı Hikmet, Hikmet 1, p.3.

⁴ M. Şeker, “Yesevî Hikmetlerinde İnsan”, in Pir-î Türkistan Hoca Ahmet Yesevî (Ankara: DİB Yayınları, 2017), p. 100.

⁵ Dîvân-ı Hikmet, Hikmet 89, p.158.

⁶ Mevlânâ Celâleddin-i Rûmî, Mesnevî-i Ma’nevî, Trans. by V.İzbudak, (Konya: Konya Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2004), Volume V, §§ 1085, 1090, p. 112.

⁷ Mesnevî-i Ma’nevî, Volume VI, § 4530, p. 335.

⁸ Abay (İbrahim Kunanbayev): Şiirler, Destanlar, Bilge Sözler, Edited by A. Kara and B.Aslan, (İstanbul: Türk Edebiyatı Vakfı Yayınları, 2020), pp. 67-68.

⁹ J-François Lyotard, “Other’s Rights”, S. Shute & S. Hurley (ed.), in On Human Rights (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 136.